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VERTICAL	  MERGERS	  AND	  THE	  MFN	  THICKET	  IN	  
TELEVISION	  	  
	   	  
By	  Erik	  Hovenkamp	  &	  Neel	  U.	  Sukhatme	  1	  
	  
I. INTRODUCTION	  
Recently,	  a	  number	  of	  cable	  and	  satellite	  TV	  service	  providers,	  known	  as	  “MVPDs,”2	  have	  sought	  
to	   combine	  with	  upstream	  programmers.	   In	   2011,	   Comcast	   obtained	   approval	   to	   acquire	  NBC	  
Universal,3	   and	   it	   is	   now	   seeking	   to	   acquire	   Sky	   PLC,	   a	   major	   European	   programmer.4	   More	  
recently,	   AT&T	   (which	   also	   owns	   DirecTV)	   successfully	   defended	   against	   the	   government’s	  
challenge	   of	   its	   proposed	   acquisition	   of	   Time-­‐Warner,5	   which	   retains	   many	   valuable	  
programming	   properties,	   including	   HBO,	   Warner	   Brothers,	   and	   Turner	   Broadcasting.	   These	  
vertical	   mergers	   are	   occurring	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	   emergent	   downstream	   competition,	   as	  
consumers	   are	   increasingly	   opting	   for	   new	   streaming-­‐based	   platforms.	   These	   “over-­‐the-­‐top”	  
(“OTT”)	  distributors	  include	  video-­‐on-­‐demand	  services	  like	  Netflix,	  as	  well	  as	  “virtual”	  MVPDs	  like	  
YouTube	  TV	  or	  Sling	  TV,	  which	  stream	  the	  same	  live	  TV	  content	  as	  cable	  or	  satellite	  providers.	  
	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   pay-­‐TV	   industry	   is	   rife	   with	   “most-­‐favored	   nation”	   (“MFN”)	  
agreements.6	  Both	  programmers	  and	  MVPDs	  increasingly	  insist	  upon	  such	  arrangements	  in	  their	  
dealings	  with	  one	  another.	   Indeed,	   there	  are	  allegedly	  even	  “MFNs	  on	  MFNs.”7	  This	  MFN	  glut	  
has	  been	  criticized	  as	  undermining	  competition	  throughout	  the	  industry.8	  One	  prominent	  claim	  
is	  such	  MFNs	  forestall	   the	  “cord-­‐cutting”	  movement	  by	  preventing	  effective	  entry	  by	  emerging	  
                                                      
1 Erik Hovenkamp is a Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard Law School, Project on the Foundations of Private Law; Visiting 
Fellow, Yale Law School, Information Society Project. Neel U. Sukhatme is Associate Professor, Georgetown 
University Law Center; Affiliated Faculty, Georgetown McCourt School of Public Policy. We are grateful to Bill 
Rogerson and Steve Salop for helpful comments. 
2 “MVPD” stands for “multichannel video programming distributor.” 
3 United States v. Comcast Corp. et al., 1:11-cv-00106 (D.D.C. 2011). 
4 Shalini Ramachandran, Comcast Drops Bid for Fox Assets, Will Focus on Pursuit of Sky, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 
2018), www.wsj.com/articles/comcast-drops-bid-for-fox-assets-will-pursue-sky-1532004447. 
5 United States v. AT&T, Inc., __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2018 WL 2930849, (D.D.C. 2018). Note, however, that the 
government recently filed a notice of appeal. 
6 In general, an MFN agreement specifies that one party, A, must give the other party, B, a deal no worse than A offers 
to some or all third parties with whom A also deals. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Developing an 
Administrable MFN Enforcement Policy, 27 ANTITRUST 15 (2013). 
7 See Initial Comments of INSP, LLC, at 24., No. 16-41 (F.C.C. Feb. 26, 2016), 
www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/10126013185310 [hereinafter INSP Comments I]. 
8 See, e.g., Shalini Ramachandran, ‘Favored Nations’ Fight for Online Digital Rights, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2012), 
https://on.wsj.com/2uOSSvF. 
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OTT	  competitors.9	  
	   MFNs	   can	   take	   many	   different	   forms	   and	   may	   have	   either	   pro-­‐	   or	   anticompetitive	  
effects.10	  Conventionally,	  an	  MFN	  gives	  its	  holder	  a	  promise	  of	  “equal	  access”	  to	  the	  transaction	  
terms	  offered	  (by	  the	  MFN	  grantor)	  to	  third	  parties.	  A	  typical	  example	  involves	  a	  large	  buyer	  who	  
requires	  an	  MFN	  ensuring	  that	   it	  gets	  a	  better	  unit	  price	   than	  smaller	  buyers.	  This	  can	  help	  to	  
facilitate	  quantity	  discounting	  over	  an	  extended	  period,	  while	  avoiding	  the	  need	  to	  stipulate	  all	  
future	  prices	   at	   the	  outset.	  Many	   such	   arrangements	   are	  benign	  or	   procompetitive.	  However,	  
MFNs	  might	  also	  injure	  competition,	  such	  as	  by	  excluding	  smaller	  competitors	  or	  by	  facilitating	  
coordination	   among	   rivals.11	   For	   instance,	   an	   “MFN-­‐plus”	   requires	   the	   grantor	   to	   give	   strictly	  
worse	  terms	  to	  third	  parties,	  which	  raises	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  MFN	  holder’s	  rivals.	  
	   In	   the	   pay-­‐TV	   industry,	   MVPDs	   have	   increasingly	   employed	   an	   atypical	   arrangement	  
known	  as	  an	  “unconditional	  MFN.”12	  These	  agreements	  may	  pose	  significant	  competition	  policy	  
concerns,	   though	   they	   have	   received	   relatively	   little	   attention	   in	   the	   antitrust	   literature.13	   An	  
unconditional	  MFN	  permits	  the	  MVPD	  to	  “cherry	  pick”	  from	  a	  programmer’s	  dealings	  with	  third	  
parties,	  taking	  for	  itself	  any	  distinct	  benefit	  provided	  to	  a	  third-­‐party	  distributor	  without	  having	  
to	   further	   assume	   whatever	   countervailing	   obligation	   the	   third	   party	   incurred	   to	   secure	   that	  
benefit.14	  
	   For	   example,	   suppose	   a	   programmer	   offers	   a	   lower	   license	   fee	   to	   a	   third-­‐party	   OTT	  
distributor,	  but	  only	  because	  this	  MVPD	  is	  taking	  just	  one	  network,	  whereas	  the	  MFN	  holder	  is	  
licensing	  three.15	  The	  MFN	  holder	  may	  then	  claim	  that	  lower	  price	  while	  continuing	  to	  distribute	  
all	   three	  networks.	  By	  contrast,	   if	   the	  MFN	  were	  conditional,	   the	  MFN	  holder	  could	  only	  claim	  
the	  better	  price	  if	  the	  third	  party	  had	  similarly	  obtained	  the	  rights	  for	  the	  same	  three	  networks.	  
For	  this	  reason,	  unconditional	  MFNs	  are	  often	  described	  as	  applying	  “term-­‐by-­‐term,”	  even	  when	  
there	  is	  an	  obvious	  quid	  pro	  quo	  or	  interdependence	  among	  different	  terms.16	  As	  clarified	  below,	  
these	  MFNs	   may	   deter	   any	   deviations	   from	   the	   standard	   content	   packages	   and	   price	   ranges	  
offered	  by	  the	  major	  incumbent	  distributors.	  
	   While	  vertical	  mergers	   in	  the	   industry	  have	  received	  widespread	  attention	  recently,	  the	  
                                                      
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Judith A. Chevalier, The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nations 
Provisions, 27 ANTITRUST 20 (2013). 
11 Id. See also C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L. J. 1182, 1208-09 (2013). 
12 See In the Matter of Promoting the Availability of Diverse and Independent Sources of Video Programming, 31 
FCC Rcd. 11352, 2016 WL 5636964 (Sept. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Proposed MFN Rulemaking]. This FCC 
rulemaking proposal, which would have prohibited unconditional MFNs, was not put into effect. 
13 One paper on Comcast’s (since-abandoned) bid to acquire TWC discusses unconditional MFNs in a footnote. See 
William P. Rogerson, Economic Theories of Harm Raised by the Proposed Comcast/TWC Transaction, in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY, at n. 107 (7th Ed., John E. Kwoka, Jr. & 
Lawrence J. White, eds., 2018). 
14 See Section III, infra. 
15 Some OTT distributors offer “skinny bundles” that include fewer networks. 
16 See, e.g., Updated Comments of INSP, LLC, No. 16-41, at 18 (F.C.C. March 30, 2016) [hereinafter INSP 
Comments II], www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/60001533407. 
August 2018   
 
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com 
Competition Policy International, Inc. 2018© Copying, reprinting, or distributing this article is 
forbidden by anyone other than the publisher or author.  [[NYCORP:3713848v10:05/12/2018--09:52 AM]] 
3 
MFN	   concerns	   are	   interrelated.	   Problematic	   MFNs,	   particularly	   (but	   not	   exclusively)	  
unconditional	   ones,	   may	   naturally	   induce	   a	   double	   marginalization	   problem,17	   even	   if	   the	  
relevant	   firms	  are	  otherwise	  capable	  of	  contracting	  around	   it.	  This	  creates	  a	  strong	  motivation	  
for	  integration,	  but	  it	  also	  raises	  a	  question	  whether	  a	  merger	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  reduce	  double	  
marginalization.	   Further,	   MFNs	   may	   compel	   a	   problematic	   form	   of	   reciprocal	   dealing	   that	  
facilitates	   de	   facto	   coordination	   between	   integrated	   rivals.	   Thus,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   problematic	  
MFNs,	   the	   industry’s	   trend	   toward	   integration	   may	   trigger	   seemingly-­‐unrelated	   forms	   of	  
anticompetitive	  conduct.	  
	   A	   further	   problem	   is	   that	   the	  MFNs	   discussed	   here	   are	   subject	   to	   strict	   confidentiality	  
agreements.18	  This	  prevents	  programmers	  from	  specifying	  precisely	  which	  firms	  are	  doing	  what.	  
As	   such,	   scholarly	   inquiries,	   including	   ours,	   necessarily	   face	   significant	   information	   limitations.	  
For	   instance,	   we	   have	   no	   ability	   to	   say	   what	   particular	   kinds	   of	   MFNs	   might	   bind	   the	  
programmers	  involved	  in	  prior	  or	  prospective	  vertical	  merger	  cases.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  information	  
constraints,	   we	   emphasize	   this	   is	   an	   area	   in	   need	   of	   further	   investigation	   by	   the	   antitrust	  
agencies.	  
	  
II. EFFICIENCY	  CONSIDERATIONS	  
Almost	  all	  vertical	  mergers	  can	  have	  potential	  procompetitive	  effects,	  the	  most	  robust	  of	  which	  
is	   elimination	   of	   double	   marginalization	   (“EDM”).	   The	   double	   marginalization	   problem	   occurs	  
whenever	   the	   unit	   price	   of	   the	   upstream	   good	   includes	   a	   markup	   (such	   as	   a	   royalty).	   An	  
upstream	  markup	   increases	   a	   downstream	   firm’s	  marginal	   cost,	   causing	   it	   to	   raise	   its	   price.	   If	  
both	   the	  upstream	  and	  downstream	   firms	  are	  monopolies,	   the	   final	  price	   is	  higher	   than	   if	   the	  
firms	  were	  integrated.	  This	  is	  because	  an	  integrated	  firm	  would	  internalize	  only	  the	  true	  costs	  of	  
joint-­‐production,	   not	   inter-­‐firm	   transfers.	   The	   result	   is	   that	   EDM	   enhances	   both	   profits	   and	  
consumer	  welfare.19	  
	   Vertical	   mergers,	   however,	  might	   also	   elicit	   countervailing	   anticompetitive	   effects.	   For	  
example,	   in	   vertically	   related	  oligopoly	  markets,	   the	  merged	   firm	  might	   exclude	   rivals	   or	   raise	  
their	   costs,	   the	   incentive	   for	  which	   arises	   only	   as	   a	   result	   of	   vertical	   integration.20	  Moreover,	  
strategic	   considerations	  might	   diminish	   or	   eliminate	   the	  merged	   firm’s	   incentive	   to	   lower	   the	  
downstream	   price	   in	   accordance	  with	   EDM.	   For	   example,	   by	   stealing	   sales	   from	   downstream	  
rivals,	  a	  downstream	  price	  cut	  may	  in	  turn	   lead	  to	  foregone	  upstream	  sales.21	  This	  opportunity	  
cost	  can	  discourage	  the	  merged	  firm	  from	  lowering	  its	  downstream	  price	  after	  the	  merger.	  	  
                                                      
17 See the next section for discussion of the double marginalization problem. 
18 See, e.g., Comments of Altitude Sports & Entertainment, Outdoor Channel, Sportsman Channel and World Fishing 
Network at 2, No. 16-41 (F.C.C. Mar 30, 2016), www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/60001533198 [hereinafter KSE Comments]. 
The comments note that programmers are also subject to non-disparagement provisions.  
19 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950); Michael H. Riordan, 
Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 145 (2008). 
20 See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988). 
21 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1970-71 (2018). 
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   EDM	  is	  not	  necessarily	  merger-­‐specific.	  Circumstances	  permitting,	  it	  can	  alternatively	  be	  
achieved	  by	  contract.	  The	  conical	  example	   is	  a	  two-­‐part	  tariff	  with	  the	  variable	  (per-­‐unit)	  price	  
component	  equal	   to	  upstream	  marginal	  cost	  and	  the	   fixed	  price	  being	   the	  source	  of	  upstream	  
profits.22	  If	  upstream	  marginal	  costs	  are	  essentially	  zero,	  as	  occurs	  with	  a	  nonrivalrous	  upstream	  
good	  like	  programming,	  then	  the	  deal	  could	  simply	  rely	  on	  fixed	  fees	  alone,	  rather	  than	  imposing	  
marginal	  fees	  per	  unit	  of	  distributor	  output.23	  
	  
III. VERTICAL	  MERGERS	  AND	  EDM	  IN	  PAY-­‐TV	  
Vertical	   mergers	   between	  MVPDs	   and	   programmers	   have	   a	   few	   distinguishing	   characteristics	  
that	   bear	   on	   the	   efficiency	   analysis.	   First,	   the	   relevant	   programming	   content	   is	   nonrivalrous:	  
once	  created,	  it	  is	  effectively	  costless	  to	  expand	  the	  volume	  of	  output,	  which	  is	  unlimited.	  There	  
is	  thus	  no	  inherent	  reason	  why	  one	  platform’s	  delivery	  of	  such	  content	  should	  interfere	  with	  rival	  
platforms’	  ability	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  Second,	  the	  value	  consumers	  get	  from	  such	  content	  typically	  
does	  not	  depend	  on	  what	  platform	  they	  use	  to	  access	   it.	  Third,	  because	  the	  content	   is	  usually	  
subject	  to	  copyright	  protection,	  the	  rightsholder	  is	  the	  only	  party	  who	  can	  supply	  it;	  there	  are	  no	  
perfect	  substitutes.	  
	   In	  mergers	   targeting	   important	  physical	  assets,	   such	  as	   complex	  production	  machinery,	  
there	   might	   by	   cost-­‐reducing	   “synergies”	   that	   result	   from	   integration	   of	   the	   two	   firms’	  
technologies.	  But	  the	  assets	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  vertical	  media	  acquisitions	  are	  intellectual	  properties,	  
not	   physical	   assets.	   Programming	   content	   is	   encoded	   in	   standard	   digital	   files,	   and	   all	   MVPDs	  
already	   specialize	   in	   distributing	   content	   in	   this	   form.	   Thus,	   absent	   a	   double	   marginalization	  
problem,	   nonexclusive	   licensing	   agreements	   would	   seem	   sufficient	   to	   provide	   an	  MVPD	   with	  
everything	  it	  needs	  to	  conduct	  its	  business	  —	  but	  not	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  rivals.	  
	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   production-­‐based	   efficiencies,	   EDM	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   the	   most	  
broadly-­‐plausible	  efficiency	  in	  MVPD-­‐programmer	  mergers.24	  However,	  it	  is	  still	  important	  to	  ask	  
whether	   it	   is	   merger-­‐specific.25	   In	   fact,	   there	   is	   some	   evidence	   that	   fixed	   fee	   licensing	   of	  
programming	   is	  often	  commercially	  practicable,	  at	   least	  when	  it	   is	  not	  frustrated	  by	  MFNs.	  For	  
example,	   Netflix	   uses	   fixed	   fees	   for	   most	   of	   its	   licensing	   agreements.26	  More	   generally,	   even	  
programmers	  who	  license	  mainly	  to	  MVPDs	  often	  use	  fixed	  fees	  when	  licensing	  with	  on-­‐demand	  
streaming	   services.27	   Finally,	   economic	   intuition	   suggests	   that,	   where	   transaction	   costs	   are	  
                                                      
22 With this tariff, there is no per-unit markup acting like a downstream marginal cost. 
23 These marginal fees are usually applied to the number of per MVPD subscribers per month. 
24 In the AT&T/Time-Warner case, AT&T advocated other efficiencies, namely developing “a national platform for 
targeted video advertising” or the creation of “innovative video features.” We will not discuss those theories, except 
to say we are skeptical that that they are merger-specific. 
25 The DOJ apparently conceded that EDM was merger-specific in the AT&T/Time-Warner case.  
26 In its webpage for “Top Investor Questions,” Netflix notes that “[w]e generally license content for a fixed fee and a 
defined time period.” The webpage is available at https://ir.netflix.com/top-investor-questions#fcq-1. 
27 See, e.g.¸ Viacom Inc., Form 10-K, at 51 (Nov. 16, 2017), https://bit.ly/2JBX7QP (noting that Viacom uses fixed 
fees when licensing to on-demand OTT services).  
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5 
substantially	  outweighed	  by	  transaction	  value,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  cable	  industry,	  then	  the	  parties	  
are	  willing	   to	  work	  harder	   to	  overcome	   the	  demand-­‐uncertainty	   that	   is	   often	  hypothesized	   to	  
preclude	  contract-­‐based	  EDM.28	  
IV. MFNS	  AND	  DOUBLE	  MARGINALIZATION	  
If	   EDM	   cannot	   be	   feasibly	   achieved	   by	   contract,	   this	   may	   be	   due	   to	   MFNs,	   not	   nebulous	  
“bargaining	  frictions.”	  To	  explore	  this	  possibility,	  we	  begin	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  relevant	  MFN	  
agreements.	  We	  then	  explain	  how	  they	  may	  naturally	  induce	  a	  double	  marginalization	  problem.	  
A. The	  MFN	  Thicket	  
MFNs	  are	  now	  pervasive	  in	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  industry.	  A	  serious	  concern	  is	  that	  MFNs	  may	  “discourage	  
discounting	  and	  other	   innovative	  arrangements”	   in	  the	  distribution	  of	  upstream	  content.29	  The	  
most	  problematic	  arrangements	  —	  unconditional	  MFNs	  —	  may	  adversely	  distort	  the	  competitive	  
process	   generally.	  Many	   independent	   programmers	   allege	   they	   are	   now	   regularly	   required	   to	  
accept	  such	  MFNs.30	  To	  ensure	  compliance,	  the	  parties	  may	  rely	  on	  “MFN	  audits”	  conducted	  by	  
third	  party	  accountants.31	  Smaller	  programmers	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  
such	  MFNs,	  since	  they	  have	  inferior	  bargaining	  power	  in	  most	  transactions.	  And,	  for	  the	  opposite	  
reason,	  relatively	  large	  MVPDs	  will	  tend	  to	  hold	  the	  most	  unconditional	  MFNs.	  
	   As	  defined	  by	  the	  FCC,	  an	  unconditional	  MFN	  “entitles	  an	  MVPD	  to	  contractual	  rights	  or	  
benefits	  that	  [the	  programmer]	  has	  offered	  or	  granted	  to	  [a	  second	  MVPD],	  without	  obligating	  
[the	  MFN	  holder]	  to	  accept	  any	  terms	  and	  conditions	  that	  are	  integrally	  related,	  logically	  linked,	  
or	  directly	  tied	  to	  the	  grant	  of	  such	  rights	  or	  benefits	  in	  the	  [the	  second	  MVPD’s]	  agreement.”32	  
In	   other	  words,	   the	  MFN	  holder	   can	  pick	   and	   choose,	   term	  by	   term,	   any	   benefits	   afforded	   to	  
other	  distributors,	  without	  assuming	  whatever	  obligation	   those	  distributors	   incurred	   to	   secure	  
that	  benefit.	  	  
	   For	   example,	   suppose	   a	   programmer	   and	   a	   larger	  MVPD	   agree	   that	   the	   programmer’s	  
content	   will	   appear	   in	   this	   MVPD’s	   premium	   tier	   (which	   has	   low	   penetration),	   for	   which	   the	  
latter	  will	  pay	  50	  cents	  per	  subscriber.	  Further,	  the	  programmer	  and	  a	  smaller	  MVPD	  agree	  this	  
content	  will	  go	  in	  this	  MVPD’s	  basic	  and	  most	  penetrative	  tier,	  and	  in	  exchange	  the	  programmer	  
agrees	  to	  a	  discounted	  rate	  of	  25	  cents.	  If	  the	  larger	  MVPD	  has	  a	  conditional	  MFN,	  then	  it	  cannot	  
claim	   the	   lower	   25-­‐cent	   rate	  without	   also	   shifting	   the	   programmer’s	   content	   to	   its	   own	   high-­‐
penetration	   tier.	   But	   if	   the	  MFN	   is	   unconditional,	   then	   it	   can	   claim	   the	   lower	   fee	  without	   any	  
                                                      
28 See, e.g., Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, Tying as a Response to Demand Uncertainty, 28 RAND J. ECON. 566 
(1997). 
29 See Steven C. Salop, The AT&T/Time Warner Merger Case: What Happened and What is Next, Medium (June 29, 
2018), https://bit.ly/2JExdvF. 
30 See, e.g., Comments of TheBlaze, Inc., No. 16-41 (F.C.C. March 30, 2016), 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001566056.pdf. 
31 See KSE Comments, supra note 18, at n. 4. Note that these audits, if undertaken between integrated competitors, 
may necessarily facilitate price information sharing. The just-cited comment notes that less restrictive MFN 
agreements permit the programmer to “self-certify” compliance, but that this option is increasingly unavailable. 
32 Proposed MFN Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 11. 
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6 
corresponding	  re-­‐tiering	  obligation.33	  	  
	   The	  benefit	  claimed	  by	  the	  MFN	  holder,	  and	  the	  obligation	  it	  can	  forego,	  can	  take	  many	  
different	  forms,	  even	  within	  a	  single	  MFN	  agreement.	  As	  one	  programmer	  writes:	  
[these	   MFNs]	   now	   cover	   virtually	   every	   material	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	  
term	   of	   a	   distribution	   agreement…	   Economic	   terms	   include	   prices,	   discounts,	  
launch	   support,	   and	   revenue	   splits;	   and	   non-­‐economic	   terms	   cover	   tier	  
placement,	   packaging,	   technology	   rights,	   and	   alternative	   platform	   distribution.	  
Modern	   MFNs	   are	   also	   cross-­‐platform,	   covering	   not	   only	   programmers’	   terms	  
with	  other	  MVPDs,	  but	  with	  OTT	  distributors	  as	  well.34	  
	   If	   each	   contract	   creates	   a	   new	   constraint	   that	   binds	   across	   other	   contracts,	   then	  
programmers	   are	   discouraged	   from	  entering	   into	   different	   kinds	   of	   agreements	  with	   different	  
MVPDs.	   In	   other	  words,	  MFNs	  might	   not	   just	   preclude	   a	   programmer	   from	  offering	   a	   smaller	  
buyer	  a	  better	  price	  for	  the	  same	  content;	  they	  might	  deter	  the	  programmer	  from	  entering	  into	  
arrangements	  that	  differ	  in	  any	  material	  way	  from	  its	  deal	  with	  the	  MFN	  holder,	  even	  if	  they	  do	  
not	  provide	  the	  other	  buyer	  with	  better	  bang	  for	  the	  buck.	  This	  is	  because	  any	  benefit	  afforded	  
in	  a	  deal	  with	  a	  smaller	  MVPD	  will	  be	  captured	  by	  its	  larger	  distributors,	  even	  if	  all	  other	  terms	  
are	  different.	  The	   result	  may	  be	   that	  “a	  network’s	  worst	   terms	   from	  any	  deal	  become	   its	  only	  
terms	  in	  all	  contracts	  with	  all	  MVPDs.”35	  	  
	   Consequently,	  MFNs	  can	  force	  conformity	  across	  distribution	  agreements.	  This	  preserves	  
the	  status	  quo,	  preventing	  innovative	  new	  distribution	  or	  packaging	  arrangements	  that	  might	  be	  
well-­‐suited	   to	   virtual	   MVPDs	   or	   other	   emerging	   platforms.	   Exacerbating	   the	   problem,	   some	  
programmers	  have	  alleged	  that,	  whereas	  MFNs	  historically	  applied	  only	  to	  third-­‐party	  MVPDs	  of	  
equal	  or	   lesser	  size	  as	  the	  MFN	  holder,	   in	  some	  cases	  they	  now	  apply	  to	  all	  other	  distributors,	  
regardless	  of	  size.36	  
B. MFNs	  and	  Double	  Marginalization	  
The	   transactional	   conformity	   created	   by	   unconditional	   MFNs	   may	   further	   induce	   a	   double	  
marginalization	  problem,	  even	  if	  the	  firms	  could	  otherwise	  contract	  around	  it.	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  
we	   first	   consider	   how	  MFNs	  prevent	   firms	   from	  achieving	   EDM	   in	   the	   context	   of	   hypothetical	  
pricing	  involving	  two-­‐part	  tariffs.	  We	  then	  show	  the	  argument	  applies	  more	  generally,	  meaning	  
that	  other	  contract-­‐based	  EDM	  approaches	  are	  similarly	  foregone.	  We	  finally	  explain	  how	  more	  
traditional	  conditional	  MFNs	  might	  also	  contribute	  to	  double	  marginalization.	  
	   Suppose	  a	  programmer	  would	  like	  to	  charge	  each	  MVPD	  a	  two-­‐part	  tariff.	  Such	  a	  tariff	  is	  
characterized	  by	  a	  pair	  (𝑝,𝐹),	  where	  p	  is	  a	  variable	  (per-­‐unit)	  price	  and	  F	  is	  a	  fixed	  fee.	  Thus,	  an	  
MVPD	   pays	   a	   total	   amount	   of	  pQ	   +	   F,	  where	  Q	   is	  MVPD	   output	   (the	   number	   of	   subscribers).	  
                                                      
33 This example is paraphrased from TheBlaze Comments, supra note 30, at 5. See KSE Comments, supra note 18, at 
3. 
34 INSP Comments I, supra note 7, at 17. 
35 Id. at 18. 
36 See KSE Comments, supra note 18, at 3.  
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Assume	  for	  simplicity	  that	  a	  programmer	  wishes	  to	   license	  to	  two	  MVPDs,	  A	  and	  B,	  where	  B	   is	  
larger	   than	   A.	   As	   noted	   earlier,	   if	   the	   marginal	   cost	   of	   licensing	   is	   effectively	   zero,	   double	  
marginalization	   is	   eliminated	   by	   agreeing	   on	   pure	   fixed	   fee	   licensing	   (i.e.,	   p	   =	   0).	   Then	   the	  
programmer	   could	   enter	   into	   two	   agreements	  with	   fixed	   fees	  𝐹!∗	   and	  𝐹!∗	   for	  MVPDs	  A	  and	  B,	  
where	  𝐹!∗ < 𝐹!∗.	  And	  the	  MVPDs	  produce	  some	  output	  levels	  𝑄!∗ 	  and	  𝑄!∗ ,	  where	  𝑄!∗ < 𝑄!∗ .	  
	   These	  contracts	  would	  achieve	  EDM.	  But	  now	  consider	  how	  unconditional	  MFNs	  would	  
forestall	  that	  result.	  When	  B	  sees	  that	  A	  is	  paying	  a	  lower	  fixed	  fee,	  B	  will	  claim	  that	  lower	  fee	  for	  
itself,	   notwithstanding	   that	   the	   lower	   fee	  was	   predicated	  on	   the	   lower	   volume	  of	   distribution	  
supplied	  by	  A.	  This	  may	  easily	  be	  a	  prohibitively	  costly	  concession	  for	  the	  programmer.	   In	  that	  
case,	  pure	  fixed	  fee	  licensing	  won’t	  happen,	  but	  only	  because	  the	  MFNs	  deter	  it.	  	  
	   One	  might	  posit	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  partial	  solution:	  charge	  a	  common	  two-­‐part	  tariff	  (𝑝,𝐹),	  with	  both	  price	  components	  being	  positive,	  to	  both	  MVPDs.	  This	  does	  provide	  conformity	  
as	  to	  the	  two	  price	  components,	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  positive	  fixed	  fee	  defrays	  some	  amount	  of	  
double	   marginalization.	   However,	   this	   necessarily	   leaves	   the	   smaller	   MVPD	   A	   with	   a	   higher	  
average	  price.	  Specifically,	  the	  average	  price	  (“AP”)	  comparison	  is:	  𝐴𝑃! =    𝐹𝑄!(𝑝)+ 𝑝     >    𝐹𝑄!(𝑝)+ 𝑝 = 𝐴𝑃!	  
	   Here,	  𝑄!(𝑝)	  denotes	  firm	  A’s	  output	  in	  the	  resulting	  equilibrium,	  and	  similarly	  for	  𝑄!(𝑝),	  
where	   the	   latter	   is	   strictly	   greater	   at	   any	   level	   of	   the	   variable	   price.37	   These	  output	  measures	  
depend	  (inversely)	  on	  𝑝	  due	  to	  double	  marginalization.	  This	  hypothetical	  tariff	  would	  thus	  leave	  
smaller	   MVPDs	   at	   a	   systematic	   cost	   disadvantage,	   diminishing	   their	   interest	   in	   carrying	   the	  
programmer’s	   content.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   there	   is	   exactly	   one	  way	   to	   avoid	   an	   asymmetry	   in	   the	  
average	  price:	  pure	  variable	  pricing	   (𝐹 = 0).	  And	  because	   the	  programmer	   is	  not	  using	  a	   fixed	  
fee	  as	  a	  profit-­‐supplement	  under	  this	  approach,	  it	  will	  set	  the	  variable	  price	  higher.	  
	   The	   programmer	   thus	   faces	   a	   Catch-­‐22.	   On	   one	   hand,	   it	   could	   rely	   on	   pure	   variable	  
pricing	   so	   that	   it	   can	   deal	  with	   all	  MVPDs,	   but	   this	   generates	   the	  maximal	   amount	   of	   double	  
marginalization.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   could	   rely	   on	   a	   (nondiscriminatory)	   two-­‐part	   tariff	   to	  
partially	  alleviate	  double	  marginalization,	  but	  this	  diminishes	  the	  number	  of	  MVPDs	  it	  can	  hope	  
to	  deal	  with.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  latter	  point,	  suppose	  that	  there	  are	  many	  MVPDs	  with	  whom	  the	  
programmer	  wants	  to	  deal,	  and	  which	  vary	  in	  size.	  Then,	  due	  to	  the	  fixed	  fee	  —	  which	  is	  set	  at	  a	  
high	   enough	   level	   to	   get	   acceptable	   value	   from	   the	   largest	  MVPDs	  —	   there	   is	   some	   range	   of	  
relatively	   small	   MVPDs	   that	   will	   not	   accept	   the	   tariff,	   because	   the	   average	   price	   would	   be	  
prohibitively	  high.	  An	  independent	  programmer	  wants	  to	  deal	  with	  as	  many	  MVPDs	  as	  possible,	  
and	   thus	   it	   likely	   prefers	   to	   rely	   on	   pure	   variable	   pricing	   to	   ensure	   it	   can	   transact	   with	   all	  
interested	  distributors.	  
	   This	  analysis	  applies	  more	  generally,	  as	  other	  contractual	  means	  of	  achieving	  EDM	  may	  
                                                      
37 Note that 𝑄!∗ ≡ 𝑄! 0 > 𝑄! 𝑝  for all 𝑝 > 0 (and similarly for B), which reflects that the MVPD internalizes the 
variable price as a marginal cost. 
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8 
similarly	   unravel.	   For	   instance,	   two-­‐part	   tariff	   contracts	   are	   very	   similar	   to	   an	   agreement	   that	  
involves	  no	   fixed	   fee,	   but	   rather	   specifies	   a	  minimum	  quantity	   and	  a	   variable	  price.	   This	   is	   an	  
alternative	  way	  of	  achieving	  EDM,	  provided	  that	  the	  quantity	  minimum	  is	  large	  enough	  to	  force	  
the	   buyer	   to	  make	  more	   sales	   than	   it	   otherwise	  would,	   given	   the	   variable	   price.38	   The	  MVPD	  
would	  make	  more	  money	   if	   it	   could	   violate	   the	  output	   floor	   by	   raising	   price,	  which	   is	  what	   it	  
would	   otherwise	   do	   as	   a	   result	   of	   having	   to	   pay	   the	  margin-­‐distorting	   variable	   fee.	   Thus,	   the	  
larger	  MVPD	  B	  can	  benefit	  by	  claiming	  the	  lower	  output	  minimum	  assigned	  to	  the	  smaller	  MVPD	  
A.39	  	  And	  it	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  further	  take	  A’s	  variable	  price	  (although	  it	  might	  want	  that,	  too).	  	  
	   Another	   way	   a	   programmer	   and	   MVPD	   can	   mitigate	   (but	   not	   necessarily	   eliminate)	  
double	  marginalization	   is	  to	  adjust	  the	  division	  of	  advertising	  revenues.	  The	  programmer	  could	  
offer	   an	  MVPD	   a	   lower	   variable	   price	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   said	   revenues.	   But	   if	  
another	  MVPD	  has	  an	  unconditional	  MFN,	  it	  could	  claim	  that	  lower	  price	  without	  conceding	  any	  
portion	  of	  its	  own	  revenue	  share.	  The	  programmers’	  comments	  highlight	  this	  kind	  of	  penalty	  on	  
discounting	   to	   smaller	   or	   “skinnier”	   distributors	   as	   one	   of	   the	   major	   problems	   caused	   by	  
unconditional	  MFNs.40	  
	   Conditional	  MFNs	  might	   also	   generate	   a	  double	  marginalization	  problem.	   For	   example,	  
suppose	   again	   that	   the	   programmer	   relies	   on	   two-­‐part	   tariffs,	   with	   both	   components	   being	  
positive.	   A	   smaller	   MVPD	   might	   get	   a	   lower	   fixed	   fee	   but	   also	   a	   higher	   variable	   price.	   The	  
relevant	  condition	  might	  simply	  be	   that	  a	   larger	  MVPD	  cannot	  get	   the	   lower	   fixed	   fee	  without	  
the	   larger	   variable	   price.	   But	   if	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   fee	   size	   is	   sufficiently	   large,	   this	  may	   be	  
profitable	  for	  the	  larger	  MVPD	  on	  balance.	  (However,	  the	  MFN	  could	  preclude	  this	  if	  there	  were	  
an	   additional	   condition	   on	   the	  maximal	   output	   level.)	   Preferring	   to	   avoid	   that	   possibility,	   the	  
programmer	  might	  just	  rely	  on	  pure	  variable	  pricing	  with	  everyone.	  	  
	   So-­‐called	   MFN-­‐plus	   arrangements,	   discussed	   earlier,	   may	   further	   exacerbate	   double	  
marginalization.	   In	  particular,	   an	  MFN-­‐plus	  may	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  variable	  price	   level,	   thereby	  
forcing	   other	   MVPDs’	   marginal	   costs	   upward.	   This	   is	   effectively	   an	   agreement	   designed	   to	  
increase	  double	  marginalization	  for	  rivals.	  
C. Relationship	  to	  Vertical	  Merger	  Concerns	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  MFNs	  distort	  prices	  upward,	   this	  alone	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  attack	  them	  on	  
antitrust	   grounds.	   But	   the	   double	   marginalization	   effects	   may	   also	   bear	   on	   considerations	   of	  
vertical	   mergers	   between	   programmers	   and	  MVPDs.	   If	   widespread	  MFNs	   lead	  many	   or	   most	  
                                                      
38 Specifically, imagine that A’s quantity minimum is set to be 𝑄!∗  and the variable price is set to the level satisfying 𝑝!𝑄!∗ = 𝐹!∗. Then firm A is committed to make an expenditure of at least this amount, and thus does not internalize 𝑝! 
as a marginal cost until its output exceeds 𝑄!∗ . But that won’t happen, since 𝑄!∗  is already A’s optimal output when it 
is not double marginalized. This arrangement is equivalent to the pure fixed fee arrangement considered above. 
39 By taking A’s output minimum (which will be lower than B’s), B’s expenditure commitment falls from 𝑝!𝑄!∗  to 𝑝!𝑄!∗  (see the preceding footnote). 
40 See, e.g., INSP Comments II, supra note 16, at 21-22 (noting that “[t]he result was that the one remaining 
distributor and its subscribers did not get the benefit of the lower rate, and the network did not get the benefit of 
broader distribution to millions of additional viewers.”). 
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9 
programmers	   to	   rely	   on	   variable	   prices,	   the	   cumulative	   effect	   may	   be	   substantial	   double	  
marginalization	   throughout	   the	   industry.	   That,	   in	   turn,	   creates	   a	   stronger	   impetus	   for	   vertical	  
integration,	   as	   this	   may	   provide	   some	   relief	   in	   the	   form	   of	   EDM.	   But,	   if	   the	   double	  
marginalization	  problem	  is	  caused	  by	  one	  of	  the	  defendant’s	  unconditional	  MFN	  commitments,	  
then	  EDM	  may	  not	  be	  merger-­‐specific.41	  Instead,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  parties’	  MFN	  commitments	  that	  
are	  preventing	  them	  from	  contracting	  around	  a	  double	  markup.	  	  
	   There	  is	  an	  important	  caveat,	  however.	  Proposed	  mergers	  that	  garner	  antitrust	  scrutiny	  
will	  tend	  to	  involve	  major	  players	  in	  the	  industry.	  And	  a	  major	  programmer	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  accept	  
an	  unconditional	  MFN,	  since	  it	  has	  significant	  bargaining	  power.	  If	  the	  programmer	  is	  not	  bound	  
by	   any	   unconditional	   MFNs,	   then	   we	   cannot	   blame	   such	   agreements	   for	   the	   double	  
marginalization	  arising	  between	  these	  defendants.	  
	   But	  this	  cuts	  in	  both	  directions:	  if	  there	  are	  no	  MFNs	  requiring	  or	  inducing	  the	  defendant-­‐
programmer	  to	  charge	  variable	  fees	  to	  the	  defendant-­‐MVPD,	  then	  the	  defendants	  cannot	  argue	  
that	  EDM	  is	  merger-­‐specific	  due	  to	  the	  industry’s	  MFN	  glut.	  That	  MFNs	  might	  be	  causing	  double	  
marginalization	   in	   other	   parties’	   dealings	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   the	   same	   result	   is	   occurring	  
between	   the	   defendants.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   if	   the	   defendant-­‐MVPD	   is	   one	   of	   the	   industry’s	  
largest,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  source	  —	  not	  the	  victim	  —	  of	  the	  most	  restrictive	  MFNs.	  In	  such	  cases,	  it	  is	  
still	  possible	  that	  the	  defendants	  could	  contract	  around	  double	  marginalization.	  
	   Further,	  that	  the	  defendant-­‐programmer	  is	  not	  bound	  by	  an	  unconditional	  MFN	  does	  not	  
rule	  out	   the	  possibility	   that	  other	  kinds	  of	  MFNs	  are	   forcing	  double	  marginalization	  within	   the	  
defendants’	   dealings.	   As	   noted	   above,	   conditional	   MFNs	   may	   also	   do	   so.	   And	   even	   a	   large	  
programmer	  may	  have	  accepted	  some	  such	  arrangements	  with	  the	  largest	  MVPDs.	  For	  instance,	  
the	   programmer	   might	   have	   an	   MFN-­‐plus	   with	   a	   very	   large	   third-­‐party	   MVPD	   such	   that	   the	  
programmer	  must	  charge	  everyone,	  including	  the	  would-­‐be	  acquirer,	  a	  higher	  variable	  price	  than	  
that	  paid	  by	   the	  MFN	  holder.	   Then,	  at	   the	  very	   least,	   some	  amount	  of	  double	  marginalization	  
between	  the	  defendants	  is	  caused	  by	  one	  of	  the	  parties’	  MFN	  commitments.	  The	  point	  is	  that,	  in	  
order	  to	  assess	  the	  likelihood	  that	  EDM	  is	  merger-­‐specific,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  look	  at	  the	  details	  of	  
the	  defendants’	  MFN	  agreements.	  
	   There	   is	   also	   a	   broader	   sense	   in	   which	   MFNs	   are	   relevant,	   which	   does	   not	   bear	   on	  
whether	   EDM	   is	   merger-­‐specific	   within	   a	   given	   case.	   Widespread,	   restrictive	   MFNs	   can	  
substantially	  constrict	   the	  competitive	  process,	  preventing	  any	  procompetitive	  deviations	   from	  
the	   status	   quo.	   This	   suggests	   that	   vertical	   mergers	   should	   not	   be	   contemplated	   as	   occurring	  
within	   an	   ordinary	   free	  market;	   any	   interrelated	  MFN	   concerns	   should	   also	   be	   accounted	   for.	  
Further,	   if	   antitrust	   enforcers	   took	   a	   more	   proactive	   approach	   in	   challenging	   anticompetitive	  
MFNs,	   this	   might	   help	   to	   allay	   some	   of	   the	   concerns	   imputed	   to	   vertical	   mergers.	   The	   next	  
section	  reinforces	  the	  latter	  point.	  
	  
                                                      
41 The defendants might argue that it is reasonably necessary to enter into such MFNs. But if the MFNs are probably 
anticompetitive in their own right, this argument is not very compelling. 
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V. MFNS	  AND	  CROSS-­‐LICENSING	  	  
MFNs	  may	   also	   induce	   anticompetitive	   effects	   in	   cross-­‐licensing	   between	   vertically-­‐integrated	  
rivals.	   When	   rival	   MVPDs	   acquire	   important	   upstream	   programmers,	   their	   relationship	   is	   no	  
longer	   purely	   horizontal.	   There	   are	   also	   countervailing	   vertical	   relationships,	   with	   each	   firm’s	  
upstream	   division	   licensing	   to	   the	   other	   firm’s	   downstream	   division.	   Steve	   Salop	   recently	  
observed	  this	  creates	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  problematic	  form	  of	  reciprocal	  dealing	  in	  which	  the	  
integrated	   rivals	   raise	   each	   other’s	   margins	   in	   parallel.42	   But,	   unlike	   a	   one-­‐way	   license	   fee	  
arrangement,	  here	  each	  firm’s	  licensing	  costs	  are	  offset	  by	  countervailing	  licensing	  receipts.	  The	  
firms	   can	   thus	   enjoy	   the	   benefit	   of	   higher	   prices	  without	   the	   profit	   losses	   that	   usually	   accrue	  
from	  increased	  marginal	  costs.	  	  
	   In	   the	   literature	   on	   patent	   agreements	   between	   product	   market	   rivals,	   this	   kind	   of	  
arrangement	  has	  long	  been	  recognized	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  achieving	  de	  facto	  downstream	  price-­‐
fixing	  without	   requiring	  an	  express	  price-­‐fixing	  agreement.43	  As	   in	   that	   context,	   the	   integrated	  
MVPDs	   can	   earn	   larger	   profits	   by	   charging	   each	   other	   artificially	   high	   variable	   fees,	   which	  
enlarges	   the	   downstream	   price	   effect.	   And,	   importantly,	   countervailing	   license	   fees	   are	   not	  
necessary	   for	   the	   firms	   to	   reach	   a	   mutually-­‐satisfactory	   agreement;	   they	   can	   “net	   out”	   the	  
countervailing	  fees	  such	  that	  only	  one	  firm	  (or	  neither)	  is	  paying	  per-­‐unit	  fees	  to	  the	  other.44	  This	  
would	   alleviate	   the	   reciprocal	   dealing	   concern,	   while	   still	   allowing	   the	   firms	   to	   account	   for	   a	  
possible	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  programming	  value	  being	  exchanged.	  
	   MFNs	   exacerbate	   the	   reciprocal	   dealing	   concerns.	  When	   one	   or	   both	   integrated	   rivals	  
have	  MFN	  obligations	  to	  third	  party	  MVPDs,	  the	  worry	  is	  not	  simply	  that	  such	  rivals	  could	  engage	  
in	  this	  problematic	  form	  of	  reciprocal	  dealing.	  Rather,	  they	  may	  feel	  contractually	  compelled	  to	  
do	  so.	  To	  illustrate,	  call	  the	  integrated	  firms	  A	  and	  B,	  and	  a	  third	  party	  MVPD	  C.	  Further,	  suppose	  
that	  B’s	  upstream	  content	  is	  more	  valuable	  than	  A’s,	  so	  that	  cross-­‐licensing	  between	  these	  firms	  
normally	  would	   require	  A	   to	   pay	   a	   net	   fee	   to	  B.	   Then,	   suppose	   further	   that	  C	  holds	   an	  MFN	  
stipulating	  that	  B’s	  upstream	  division	  cannot	  charge	  lower	  fees	  to	  anyone	  else	  than	  it	  charges	  to	  
C.	  Then,	  from	  B’s	  perspective,	  it	  must	  charge	  a	  countervailing	  fee	  to	  A.	  But	  that	  means	  the	  firms	  
cannot	  net	  out	  their	  fee	  obligations	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  reciprocal	  dealing	  concern.	  	  
	   It	  may	   be	   that	   even	   a	   conditional	  MFN	  would	   lead	   to	   this	   result,	   since	   cross-­‐licensing	  
between	  A	  and	  B	  may	  consist	  in	  separate	  one-­‐way	  licensing	  agreements.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  rights	  
licensed	  from	  A	  to	  B	  would	  ostensibly	  not	  be	  a	  condition	  on	  the	  fee	  charged	  by	  B	  to	  A.	  Then	  a	  
conditional	  MFN	  would	  preclude	  B	  from	  setting	  a	  discounted	  fee	  to	  A	   in	   light	  of	  the	  content	   it	  
receives.	  The	  same	  would	  apply	  to	  A’s	  fee	  if	  it	  has	  also	  entered	  into	  an	  MFN	  with	  C.	  	  
	   As	  this	  illustrates,	  MFN	  obligations	  held	  by	  integrated	  rivals	  may	  essentially	  require	  such	  
                                                      
42 Salop, supra note 21, at 1977-78. 
43 Carl Shapiro, Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 26 (1985). In the patent case, the firms 
are product market competitors who also cross-license patents in the “upstream” licensing market, with each firm 
charging a per-unit royalty to the other. 
44 See Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Proportional Restraints in Horizontal Patent Settlements, at 26-30 
(manuscript under review, 2018), available at  https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3026380. 
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rivals	   to	  strike	  agreements	   that	   raise	  serious	  antitrust	  concerns.	  And	  such	  concerns	  are	  wholly	  
separate	   from	   those	   attending	   vertical	   integration	   itself.	   Indeed,	   the	   relevant	   restraints	   are	  
horizontal	   in	   the	   reciprocal	   dealing	   agreement.45	   Hence,	   MFNs	   might	   enlarge	   the	   broader	  
competitive	  effects	  of	  vertical	  mergers.	  
	  
VI. CONCLUSION	  
Vertical	   mergers	   in	   the	   pay-­‐TV	   industry	   have	   recently	   received	   significant	   attention	   in	   the	  
antitrust	   community.	  But	  problematic	  MFNs	   raise	  a	  number	  of	   interrelated	   competition	  policy	  
concerns	   that	   have	   been	   largely	   overlooked.	   Restrictive	   MFNs	   may	   significantly	   distort	  
competition	  within	   the	   industry.	   They	  may	  naturally	   induce	  double	  marginalization,	   creating	   a	  
strong	  impetus	  for	  integration.	  This	  simultaneously	  raises	  a	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  merger	  is	  
necessary	  to	  achieve	  EDM.	  The	  MFNs	  may	  also	  induce	  anticompetitive	  effects	  in	  cross-­‐licensing	  
between	  integrated	  rivals.	  
	   Near	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Obama	  administration,	   the	  FCC	   issued	  a	  proposed	  rulemaking	  that	  
would	   prohibit	   unconditional	   MFNs.46	   The	   proposed	   rule	   was	   ultimately	   not	   put	   into	   effect.	  
However,	  given	  the	  MVPD	   industry’s	   recent	  trend	  toward	   integration,	   the	  social	  costs	  of	   these	  
potentially-­‐anticompetitive	  MFNs	  will	  only	  continue	  to	  grow.	  To	  that	  end,	  we	  emphasize	  that	  the	  
antitrust	  authorities	  should	  investigate	  restrictive	  MFNs	  in	  the	  television	  industry,	  and	  that	  such	  
arrangements	  should	  be	  accounted	  for	  when	  evaluating	  vertical	  mergers.	  
	  
                                                      
45 Note that, for this reason, the concerns discussed here are not limited to cases involving dominant integrated firms. 
46 Proposed MFN Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 1. 
